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Abstract:  Understanding precisely the nature of competition in primary healthcare has an
important role to play in understanding how to improve the delivery of healthcare services. This
is particularly the case in Ireland, where the private sector plays such a large role in primary care.
If we do not understand competition, well-intentioned regulations and policies are less likely to be
effective and more likely to result in excessive costs and under-utilisation of primary healthcare.
This in turn can increase Ireland’s overall health expenditure and contribute to a higher cost of
living in Ireland and thus lower competitiveness. This paper shows how well-designed regulations
and systems for State funding of  primary healthcare can ensure that competition works well and
contributes to the better availability and quality of services at the lowest possible cost. The most
common barriers to entry and expansion in primary healthcare markets are outlined and price-
setting mechanisms examined. Examples are used to illustrate the benefits to consumers and the
State where these obstacles to competition have been removed, and the difficulties where they
remain. Conclusions are drawn on the implications of this analysis for the governance of
regulatory bodies, for regulatory Codes of Conduct, and for achieving value for money. It is time
for the culture of the healthcare professions to move towards one where it is no longer considered
“unprofessional” to provide a competitive service.
I INTRODUCTION
O
ver the past decade the Competition Authority has examined competition
across a range of primary healthcare services – with particular focus on
general medical practitioner (“GP”), pharmacy, dental and optometry (eye
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04 Boate PP Paper_ESRI Vol 42-1  16/09/2011  10:00  Page 313care) services.1 This paper summarises the common themes and learning
gained from that work,2 and the key implications for the delivery of affordable,
high quality primary healthcare services in Ireland. 
Understanding precisely the nature of competition in primary healthcare
has an important role to play in understanding how to improve the delivery of
healthcare services. This is particularly the case in Ireland where the private
sector plays such a large role in primary care. If we do not understand
competition, well-intentioned regulations and policies are less likely to be
effective and can even be harmful. Regulations and administrative decisions
about State funding of services can go too far in their attempts to protect
consumers and end up depriving consumers of the benefits of ethical
competition between suitably qualified providers – lower prices and better
availability and quality of services.
If competition is unnecessarily restricted, consumers and the State face
higher costs and less availability of primary healthcare services. This can lead
to under-utilisation of primary healthcare and this increases overall health
expenditure (most likely due to lower prevention rates and greater use of
secondary care). Excessive costs in primary care also contribute to a higher
cost of living in Ireland, and push up wage demands – making Ireland less
competitive.
This paper shows how well-designed regulations and systems for State
funding of primary healthcare can ensure that competition works well and
contributes to the better availability and quality of services at the lowest
possible cost. First, the relationship between competition and regulation in
Ireland is set out. Second, the obstacles to competition identified by the
Competition Authority as harmful to consumers and the State are outlined.
Finally, conclusions are drawn on the implications of this analysis for
regulatory structures and rules, and value for money for consumers and the
State.
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1 There are four eye-care professions in Ireland – optometrists, dispensing opticians, orthoptists
and ophthalmologists. The main functions of the eye-care professionals are as follows:
optometrists carry out eye examinations and dispense spectacles and contact lenses; dispensing
opticians dispense spectacles and contact lenses as prescribed by optometrists or, less frequently,
ophthalmologists; orthoptists are involved in the assessment, diagnosis and management of
disorders of the eyes, extra ocular muscles and vision; and ophthalmologists are medical
practitioners who treat diseases and conditions of the eye. This paper concentrates on the services
offered to consumers by optometrists and dispensing opticians. Many consumers refer to these two
professions collectively as opticians.
2 The Competition Authority’s views and analysis are available from the Authority’s website
www.tca.ie
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HEALTHCARE?
In Ireland, anyone in need of a tooth filling, an eye test, medicines, or the
advice of a GP, for the most part obtains these services from a private
business.3 Some businesses are sole traders, some are partnerships among
qualified professionals, some are corporate entities – but they each charge
private fees to private clients. As with all businesses, primary healthcare
providers compete for customers.
Even where the State is paying for the service on the customer’s behalf, it
is largely the patient who decides which healthcare provider to attend and the
money follows the patient. Thus providers also compete for “public” patients.
The Irish State operates three main schemes whereby, generally, certain goods
or services are provided free or at a reduced rate to the patient and the
supplier is reimbursed (the balance) by the State:4
(i) Medical card scheme: persons with incomes below a certain threshold
receive GP care, prescription medicines, eye tests and a limited range of
eyeglasses and dental services entirely free of charge. 
(ii) Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) scheme: persons who have paid a
certain level of social insurance payments over a number of years are
entitled to subsidised eye tests and dental services.5
(iii)Drugs Payment Scheme (DPS): all residents of the State who do not have
a medical card have their monthly expenditure on prescription medicines
capped at €120.
Each business (the pharmacy, opticians’ practice, GP or dentist) must have
a relevant contract with the State to participate in each scheme.6 The Irish
system whereby some residents pay the full cost of GP care and medicines and
others pay nothing, is unusual in Western Europe – where primary care is
generally free or subsidised at a greater level for all residents. Also, some other
European countries have ownership restrictions – such as restrictions on who
may own pharmacies and the number of pharmacies they may own (Indecon,
2003a, Chapter 4). 
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3 Some primary care services are provided through a very small number of direct employees of the
State; for example, children’s dental care.
4 Many other schemes exist which provide free or subsidised goods or services to certain groups of
people: e.g. Long Term Illness Scheme, Mother and Baby Scheme, GP Visit Card scheme.
5 The dental services available under this scheme were drastically curtailed in 2009 following the
economic crisis, and currently consist only of one free check-up, scale and polish per year.
6 For example, a dentist must have a contract with the Health Service Executive to be reimbursed
for treating medical card holders and another contract with the Department of Social Protection
to be reimbursed for treating PRSI beneficiaries.
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is: the quality and range of the goods/services they provide, the location and
standard of their premises, customer care, the advertising and promotion they
undertake to attract customers, and – in the case of private patients – the
prices they charge. Of course they do this in a highly-controlled environment
(compared to many other non-health services).7 However, essentially, GPs,
pharmacists, opticians and dentists all provide their services in an economic
marketplace that remains subject to the laws of supply and demand. 
A recent OECD study put the issue well:
The issue for policy makers… is not whether markets are good or bad, but
whether fostering some aspects of competition and markets in the health sector
can lead to more rational use of resources, and which aspects of competition have
the greatest potential to get results. (OECD, 2009.)
If competition is unnecessarily restricted, consumers and the State face
higher costs and less availability of primary healthcare services.8 Healthcare
prices in Ireland rose substantially faster than general inflation (the consumer
price index) during the “Celtic Tiger” boom years, and even after the recession
hit in 2008 (as Figure 1 shows). This was particularly true for dental services.
Excessive cost of healthcare services can lead to “under-utilisation” of
services by some people. For example, a number of recent studies and surveys
suggest that a substantial proportion of private patients in Ireland have put
off visiting their GP due to the price, thus potentially letting a health problem
become worse (O’Reilly et al., 2006).9 This in turn is associated with higher
overall health expenditure (Brick et al., 2011, p. 89). Excessive costs in
primary care also contribute to a higher cost of living in Ireland, and push up
wage demands – making Ireland less competitive. It is not only about money.
Better understanding of competition, and appropriate regulation of
competition in primary healthcare, can also promote better availability of
services, better quality services, and innovation, as this paper will show.
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7 GPs and pharmacies could be viewed as less-controlled in Ireland compared to their European
counterparts as they have free rein to charge whatever price they wish to private patients and
there are no ownership controls.
8 Studies of the effects of lifting restrictions competition by advertising or from competing
professions have shown the beneficial impact on cost. See for example: Benham (1972), Benham
et al. (1975); Bond et al. (1980), Love et al. (1996), Rosenstein (1985), and OECD (2004).
9 O’Reilly et al., (2006) found that 18.9 per cent of patients had a medical problem during the year
but did not consult their GP due to cost. A national survey of 100 GPs, carried out by the Irish
Medical Times, reported that 63 per cent of respondents believed that patients are delaying visits
to their GP due to financial constraints – Irish Examiner, 2 March 2009. A similar pattern was
reported in a survey carried out by www.rollercoaster.ie in August 2008 on behalf of the HSF
Health Plan.
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GP, pharmacy, dental and opticians’ services are all heavily regulated and
do not operate in “free” markets, for good reasons. First, a typical consumer of
healthcare services will not have enough knowledge to evaluate either the
quality of the service on offer prior to purchase or the quality of the service
they actually receive.10 If high quality service providers cannot distinguish
themselves from low quality service providers, the average quality of service
tends to be lower and the average price higher. It is also difficult for consumers
to spot rogue (unqualified) service providers. Second, a person’s health could
suffer substantial, and even life-threatening, damage if they received poor
quality healthcare from a GP, pharmacist, dentist or optometrist. 
Therefore, to protect consumers, each of these four professions has
traditionally been regulated by a dedicated statutory regulator that sets
minimum standards of qualifications required to practice medicine, pharmacy,
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Figure 1: Health Inflation and the Consumer Price Index, 2000-2009
10 Economists refer to such goods and services as “credence goods”.
Source: Central Statistics Office. Data for 2009 are the average for January-August
2009. All other years are annual averages.
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The four regulators are, respectively: the Medical Council, the Pharmaceutical
Society of Ireland, the Dental Council and the Opticians’ Board.11 Each
regulator keeps a “register” of all those who have obtained the appropriate
qualifications for the relevant profession and approves educational institu  -
tions’ courses and qualifications as sufficient for entry on to the register. In the
case of GPs, the Medical Council has approved a number of institutions for the
provision of university degrees in medicine, and the Irish College of General
Practitioners’ four year programme of hospital-based and in-practice training
as leading to the specialist qualification of General Practitioner (“MICGP”).12
Dentists are trained in two universities,13 pharmacists in three universities14
(with a year of supervised practice also required for qualification), and
optometrists in just one school.15
Minimum standards of entry to a profession aim to ensure that the
professional is capable of providing a high quality service. To avoid situations
where capable (suitably qualified) professionals cut corners, or make
exaggerated claims about their abilities, or unethically encourage a client to
purchase more services than they really need,16 regulators operate codes of
conduct and ethics that the regulated professionals must follow. Pharmacies
are subject to additional regulatory standards regarding their premises.
Where the State has contracts with primary healthcare providers, to provide
free or subsidised services to certain people, these contracts are also used to
impose certain quality standards, such as minimum opening hours and
appropriate record keeping. Unfortunately, sometimes regulations go far
beyond what is needed to protect consumers from harm and, perversely, also
cause harm. They can unnecessarily restrict competition between businesses
in ways that reduce the availability of services and raise the cost of services to
consumers and the State. The administration of State contracts for primary
healthcare services also has a huge impact on the availability of services and
competition between providers. This impact can have both positive and
negative aspects.
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11 The regulators operate under the Medical Practitioners Act 2007, the Pharmacy Act 2007, the
Dentists Act 1985, and the Opticians Acts 1956 and 2003.
12 Technically, any fully qualified doctor can legally set up a practice in general medicine and begin
treating patients. However, an increasing number of GP practices are headed by a doctor who has
completed specialist GP training, though not all the doctors working in the practice will have done
so.
13 Trinity College Dublin and University College Cork.
14 Trinity College Dublin, University College Cork and Royal College of Surgeons.
15 The Dublin Institute of Technology.
16 This is known as “supplier-induced demand.”
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COMPETITION?
In analysing the four healthcare professions from a competition
perspective, the Competition Authority identified three areas where there
were obstacles to competition that were impacting negatively on the delivery
of healthcare services:
1. Getting in. 
2. Getting customers.
3. Price-setting.
The Authority also questioned the membership structure of the regulators
in Ireland – who is regulating the profession and putting these obstacles in
place? It found that the regulators were wholly or almost entirely composed of
members of the profession itself and this created significant potential for
conflicts of interests to arise within the regulator.
The rest of this paper outlines the issues in each of these four areas.
4.1 Getting In
In Ireland, it is illegal to call yourself a “dentist”, “pharmacist”, or
“optometrist” (optician) unless you are on the relevant regulator’s register.
These professional titles are “reserved” for those whom the regulator deems to
be appropriately qualified.17 In addition, it is illegal to practise dentistry,
medicine or optometry, or to dispense medicines without being on the
appropriate register.18 Thus the number of qualified professionals available to
provide services in these highly-regulated markets is largely determined by
the courses and qualifications recognised by the relevant regulator for
registration. 
The Competition Authority identified four kinds of barriers to entering the
markets for optometry, dental, pharmacy and GP services:
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17 This type of regulation is called “reservation of title” and is becoming increasingly common in
Ireland, especially in the health sector. For example, the Health and Social Care Professionals 
Act 2005 created legal protection for the titles of “clinical biochemist”, “dietician”, “medical
scientist”, “occupational therapist”, “orthoptist”, “physiotherapist”, “podiatrist”, “psychologist”,
“radiographer”, “social care worker”, “social worker” and “speech and language therapist”. The
title of “general medical practitioner” is not reserved, however, the Medical Practitioners Act 2007
provides that the Minister for Health and Children may at some stage in the future introduce
regulations to reserve the title.
18 This level of regulation is called “reservation of function” and is a heavier level of regulation
than “reservation of title”. For example, under the Health and Social Care Professionals Act 2005,
only those on the relevant register are entitled to call themselves a “psychologist” but others are
entitled to provide services similar to those provided by a psychologist, such as counsellors and
psychotherapists. 
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2. Non-recognition of equivalent training in Ireland;
3. Non-recognition of equivalent foreign qualifications;
4. Non-recognition of related or “para” professions.
In each instance, the barrier reduces the availability of service providers
in Ireland and in turn reduces competition. This is in part because primary
healthcare services are locally supplied – consumers are generally not willing
to travel far to obtain these services.19 Thus an overall reduction in numbers
leads to less competition between professionals at local level. In the case of
related professions, however, there is also an outright restriction on
competition between related professions.
4.1.1 Number of Training Places in Ireland
The largest determinant of the number of dentists, optometrists,
pharmacists and GPs in Ireland is the number of education and training
places available on recognised courses in Ireland. Increasing the number 
of places available to study a particular primary healthcare profession in
Ireland would increase the number of qualified persons providing these
services in Ireland, and thus promote competition. In each of the professions
examined, the Competition Authority found that the number of training places
had not been increased for a long time – sometimes decades – despite
escalating demand.20 Training of orthodontists had been “stop-start”
(Department of Health, 2006). Until recently, Ireland had only one school of
pharmacy. 
In most cases, the Competition Authority recommended that the number
of training places available in Ireland be reviewed. The Authority did not
recommend a precise number of places as this decision requires a weighing up
of a variety of factors, only one of which is competition and the demand for
graduates. Factors that need to be considered include: the cost of the
additional training places (which is generally high21), the expected future
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19 Though the emergence of the phenomenon of “dental tourism” suggests otherwise – whereby
Irish people have travelled to Northern Ireland, Hungary and other countries to obtain dental
work at substantially lower prices – this is peculiar to certain high-end services and reflects large
differences in the economies of these countries (including their healthcare delivery model) and
increased travel to Northern Ireland and Europe generally. Most people will visit a local dentist
for most services, for example, when they have a toothache or require a check-up and clean.
20 Over half of the additions to the Register of Dentists in 2006 were trained outside the State.
Competition Authority (2007, p. 19).
21 According to the Higher Education Authority, dentistry is the most expensive undergraduate
course in Ireland, followed by veterinary medicine, engineering and human medicine. Competition
Authority (2007, p. 49).
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another healthcare professional instead. For example, assigning more hospital
training posts to GP training means not assigning those posts to another
medical specialty. 
4.1.2 Non-recognition of Equivalent Training in Ireland
As registration by the relevant regulator is key to entering the four
primary healthcare markets, it is important that all appropriate routes to
achieving legal recognition in Ireland are recognised by the regulator. The
Competition Authority found that a particular route to becoming a fully-
qualified GP – “self-structured training” – is not recognised by the regulator,
even though this route is recognised in all other medical specialties. Self-
structured training refers to junior doctors completing a set of six-month posts
in recognised training hospitals, in relevant areas of medicine for their chosen
speciality, by applying for such posts themselves rather than going through an
organised (“structured”) training programme.
4.1.2.1  General Practitioners (GPs)
Nowadays, most GPs undergo four years of post-graduate on-the-job
supervised training in addition to their university degree and one year
hospital internship.
● The first two years of this training is undertaken by working as a junior
doctor in hospitals, in four six-month designated training posts covering
four key areas of medicine required for general practice, such as
paediatrics. 
● The following two years involve working in a GP practice under the
supervision of a fully qualified GP. 
The four year programme is overseen by the Irish College of General
Practitioners (“ICGP”) and leads to the qualification of “MICGP”, which is 
the qualification recognised by the Medical Council for entry on the register 
as a GP.
The Competition Authority found that some of the GP trainees who
successfully obtained one of the 120 sought after ICGP training places22 were
repeating hospital training that they had already obtained. For example, a GP
trainee can end up working in a six months paediatrics training post as part
of their training even though they held the exact same post previously. This is
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22 In 2009, the ICGP received 360 applications for 120 training posts. This is typical and
demonstrates that there is certainly no shortage of doctors who would like to become GPs. (In
2010 the number of ICGP training places increased to 157.)
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upon completing their internship apply for other junior hospital doctors posts,
some of which are identical to the GP training posts. Even doctors who have
completed all four required six month hospital rotations, in identical training
posts, have to begin the four year GP training programme from the start. 
The requirement to repeat training extends the length of training for these
doctors. This in turn delays and limits the number of new GPs available to
treat patients in Ireland. All other medical specialties have traditionally
recognised self-structured training and the ICGP is an anomaly in this regard.
The main reason for this anomaly is that, unlike other junior hospital doctors,
GP trainees also attend a weekly workshop to increase their understanding of
practising medicine outside of the hospital setting.
The Competition Authority recommended a fast-track GP training course
for doctors who have already acquired relevant hospital training and
experience. Suitable applicants would be able to proceed directly to the final
two years of the training programme, subject only to completing a short
general practice orientation course (to replicate the learning gained from the
weekly workshops). This recognition of prior learning would enable more GPs
to be trained as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible, while eliminating
unnecessary duplication of training. It would help alleviate the serious
shortage of GPs that Ireland is facing.23 The ICGP welcomed this
recommendation and is currently in discussions with the Health Service
Executive (“HSE”) regarding the availability of funding.24 In November 2010,
the Irish Government agreed a Programme of Financial Support with the
EU/IMF and committed to a range of actions to manage the public finances
and to promote the competitiveness of Ireland’s economy. This included a
commitment to … eliminate restrictions on the number of qualifying GPs by
the end of Q3 of 2011.25 Implementing the Competition Authority’s
recommendation would remove the restrictions.
4.1.3 Non-recognition of Equivalent Foreign Qualifications
As places on recognised Irish courses are limited, some Irish people travel
abroad to train as a pharmacist, dentist, general medical practitioner or
optometrist and later return to Ireland. More generally, foreign-trained
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23 Competition Authority (2010a). See also, for example, Layte et al. (2009) and Behan et al.
(2009).
24 GP trainees continue to be paid salaries by the HSE when they do their two years supervised
practice in a GP practice. Payments from private patients seen by the GP trainee, and payments
from the State on behalf of public patients seen by the GP trainee, go to the trainer GP (not the
trainee). The trainer GP also receives a direct payment for training the GP trainee.
25 EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland, revised May 2011, available from
www.finance.gov.ie
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(rapidly) increasing demand.26 Any lack of recognition of foreign qualifications
that are truly equivalent to the recognised Irish qualifications cuts off this
source of supply. Such barriers limit the availability of service providers in
Ireland. 
The Competition Authority found such a barrier in the pharmacy
profession.27 This barrier has since been removed and Ireland now has one of
the most open (though still highly regulated) regimes for opening a pharmacy
in Europe. More generally, EU Directives ensure the mutual recognition of
many equivalent professional qualifications to facilitate the free movement of
people across the EU. Also, Ireland has a number of reciprocity arrangements
in place to recognise certain health professionals trained in Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the US.
4.1.3.1 Pharmacy
Every pharmacy in Ireland must be supervised by a registered pharmacist
on the premises at all times. In 1985, Ireland obtained a derogation from an
EU Directive28 so that a pharmacist who trained in another EU country could
not supervise an Irish pharmacy that was less than three years old.29 This
restriction applied equally to Irish nationals who trained in another EU
country. To be clear, the derogation was not that a foreign-trained pharmacist
must have three years experience in Ireland before they could take on a
supervisory role; it was that the pharmacy must be three years old in order 
to have a foreign-trained supervising pharmacist. Thus, the function of
supervising pharmacies that were less than three years old was reserved to
Irish-trained pharmacists. Foreign qualifications were recognised as
equivalent when it came to supervising pharmacies that were at least three
years old but not for newer pharmacies. As the number of Irish-trained
pharmacists was limited to the graduates of the one school of pharmacy
Ireland had at the time, the derogation made it more difficult for new
pharmacies to open up. 
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26 Over half of the additions to the Register of Dentists in 2006 were trained outside the State.
Competition Authority (2007, p. 19).
27 Also, the Medical Council in 2010 invited submissions on its draft new rules for assessing the
equivalence of foreign qualifications for the purposes of getting on to its various registers,
including the GP specialist register, and the Competition Authority made a submission to the
public consultation. Competition Authority (2010b).
28 EU Directive on the Mutual Recognition of Qualifications in Pharmacy (Directive 85/433/EEC
of 16 September 1985) – in Article 2.2.
29 European Communities (Recognition of Qualifications in Pharmacy) regulations, 1987, 1991
and 1994.
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for Health and Children commenced the remaining provisions of the
Pharmacy Act 2007. It did not lead to any major jump in pharmacy numbers
in Ireland. Ireland already had a high number of pharmacies per head of
population relative to other European countries (Department of Health, 2003,
Appendix 1, p. ii). The Irish authorities placed less ownership restrictions on
pharmacies and paid retail pharmacies the highest margins in Europe (Bacon
et al, 1999), which the Minister for Health reduced later in 2009, and so had
attracted a relatively high level of investment in pharmacies. Many other EU
countries continue to avail of the three-year-rule derogation.
4.1.4 Non-recognition of Related Professions
Though “practising dentistry” and “practising optometry”, for example, are
reserved by law to dentists and optometrists, respectively, the legislation
allows for a wider group of professions to be recognised as legally entitled to
practice particular aspects of dentistry or optometry. Some of these related
professions operate under supervision – for example, dental nurses aid
dentists and orthodontists to treat patients, e.g. by sterilising equipment.
Some can operate independently – for example, a “dispensing optician” can
supply and fit spectacles and contact lenses without supervision by an
optometrist (only optometrists can perform eye tests).
Any unnecessary barriers to related professions operating in Ireland
reduces the overall availability of services. Recognising related professions can
free up professionals with higher qualifications to supply those services that
only they are qualified to provide. Where a related profession is trained to
operate independently of the core profession, they compete with the core
profession for the particular subset of services they are trained to provide. The
Competition Authority found that a lack of recognition of certain professions
in dental and optometry services had led to reduced availability of these
services, long waiting lists for some services, less choice for consumers, and
less pressure to keep prices competitive.
4.1.4.1 Dentistry
The Dentists Act 1985 specifically envisaged the recognition of an
independent profession trained to provide dentures to members of the public,
known as a Clinical Dental Technician (a “CDT”).30 A dental technician is
trained to make dentures and is not allowed to supply them directly to the
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30 This followed the publication of a report in 1982 which recommended the introduction of the
new profession in Ireland, Restrictive Practices Commission (1982).
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have the clinical expertise required to safely take a mould of a person’s mouth
and fit the dentures to the person.32 A CDT is qualified to offer dentures
directly to the public, in competition with dentists.
CDTs were finally recognised in Ireland in October 2008, following a
recommendation by the Competition Authority. As of April 2011, there were 15
clinical dental technicians registered with the Dental Council.33 Now denture
wearers have a choice as to whom they obtain dentures from – a dentist or the
“one-stop-shop” option of a CDT – and dentists face competition from clinical
dental technicians. The Dental Council has also moved to establish courses in
clinical dental technology in Ireland – another recommendation of the
Competition Authority. Those CDTs currently registered with the Dental
Council all obtained their qualifications abroad.
The long delay in recognising CDTs in Ireland was in part due to
disagreements between the Dental Council and the Minister for Health and
Children (who had to sign off on any new scheme for recognising CDTs). For
example,34 the Dental Council wanted a system whereby consumers could only
visit a CDT after they had obtained a “Certificate of Oral Health” from their
dentist. It was claimed by the Council that this was necessary to ensure
patients were checked for oral cancer and made aware of all options available
to them to replace missing teeth. The Competition Authority’s analysis was
that those patients considering dentures for the first time should certainly
consider all their options but they are likely to attend a dentist in any case for
that very reason. Also, CDTs are trained to detect abnormalities and inform
the patient that they should visit their dentist. There was no evidence that a
repeat denture wearer would require a general check up anymore than any
other patient. 
In the intervening 20 years, anyone needing dentures had to go to a
dentist and pay a double margin on their dentures – one margin to the dental
technician who made the denture and one to the dentist who fitted the
denture. There was no legitimate “one-stop-shop” option of a CDT in Ireland,
though there were a number of dental technicians practicing dentistry
illegally by offering to fit dentures for members of the public. CDTs exist in the
UK, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden
and Finland. 
COMPETITION IN PRIMARY HEALTHCARE IN IRELAND 325
31 This is a not considered to be practising dentistry.
32 This is considered to be practising dentistry.
33 Source: Dental Council of Ireland.
34 More issues were involved but only one is presented here for illustrative purposes. See
Competition Authority (2007).
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found that it was lower for dentures, where dentists faced competition from
CDTs, than for all other dental treatments (Rosenstein et al., 1985).35 The
establishment of a register of CDTs in Ireland should similarly help keep down
the rate of inflation for dentures in Ireland while providing an important
signal to the public as to which dental technicians have appropriate clinical
training.
The Competition Authority also recommended the introduction of another
independent profession in dentistry called Advanced Dental Hygienists –
dental hygienists with additional qualifications to allow them to offer their
services directly to the public (as exist in the US and other countries). This
recommendation requires a change in the primary legislation (the Dentists Act
1985) and has not yet been implemented.
4.1.4.2 Optometry
Children identified in national school exit health screening as requiring an
eye exam are being referred to highly qualified Health Service Executive
(“HSE”) ophthalmic physicians (specialist doctors) and face long waiting lists
for these appointments in a number of areas (Kelly, 2008). The Competition
Authority’s examination revealed that there was unanimous agreement across
health professionals that these children could instead be seen and treated by
optometrists, and referred on to ophthalmic physicians in the relatively few
cases that required such expertise (Competition Authority, 2006, p. 24). The
Competition Authority recommended that children identified at national
school exit screening should be referred to optometrists in the first instance.
This recognition of the qualifications of optometrists, and the role they can
play in eliminating waiting lists, has been piloted but not implemented.
Implementing this recommendation would free up the time of ophthalmic
physicians to focus on the services which only they are qualified to provide,
e.g. treatment of disease of the eye. All children would be seen by an
appropriate professional straightaway – thus eliminating waiting lists – and
those children who have a more serious issue and really need to see an
ophthalmic physician would be seen quicker.36
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35 CDTs are known in America as “Denturists”.
36 In addition to optometrists being more plentiful in supply than ophthalmic physicians, with
virtually no waiting lists, they cost the State less than €25 per eye test. Salaries paid to
community ophthalmic physicians by the HSE in 2006 were between €83,000 and €87,000 per
annum. Competition Authority (2006).
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Two restrictions on competition have made it difficult for new primary
healthcare providers to grow their business and compete with established
businesses: 
1. Lack of access to State contracts for providing State-subsidised services; 
2. Regulations regarding advertising.
These factors can completely deter new businesses from opening. They
have reduced the availability of services, made it more difficult for consumers
to make informed decisions about their health, and dampened price
competition between service providers.
4.2.1 Access to State Contracts
Obtaining a State contract for reimbursement for providing services
funded under State schemes can be vital to establishing a successful primary
care business. If access to these contracts is unnecessarily restricted, the
number of businesses is reduced and the threat of competition from a new
business removed. This reduces the availability of primary care services in
Ireland and reduces competition between established businesses. Access to
State contracts arose as an issue in GP, pharmacy, and dental services.
4.2.1.1  General Practitioners (GPs)
Obtaining a State contract to treat public patients is vitally important to
having a successful GP practice. Without a contract, GPs who want to set up
in practice are denied access to one-third of the population (who account for
half of all GP visits) and miss out on the significant financial benefits that
accrue to contract holders.37 Payments to State-contracted GPs effectively
subsidise the entire practice of the contract holder, making it very difficult for
non-contract holders to compete on price for private patients. For example,
GPs with State contracts received, on average, €65 from the State per visit
made by a public patient in 2008;38 the average GP fee per private patient visit
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37 GPs receive capitation payments for treating their “list” of public patients but also various
allowances and fee-per-item payments (e.g., for administering the swine flu vaccine) as well as
superannuation contributions. The average amount received by a GP from the State in 2008 was
€220,000 (the GP may have employee GPs working in their practice who treat public patients and
this amount includes the services of such GPs). Competition Authority (2010a, p. 53).
38 This figure takes account of all payments received by GPs from the State under the GMS
contract, not just the capitation fee; see Competition Authority (2010a, p. 53 and footnote 96).
Since 2008 the Minister for Health and Children has twice reduced the amount of payments to
GPs under the GMS, using the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 2009
(the “FEMPI Act”), so this figure is likely to have fallen.
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GPs in Ireland opt to set up a private-only practice.40
So how does a GP go about getting one of these essential contracts?
Completion of professional training, and registration with the Medical Council
as a GP, does not automatically entitle a GP to apply for a State contract to
treat public patients. A GP has to wait for the Health Service Executive
(“HSE”) to advertise for a GP to take up a contract in a specified location;
usually the contract comes with a list of public patients who need a GP. 
The HSE awards contracts in three situations:
(1) Retirement, death or resignation of a GP who is an existing contract-
holder;
(2) Creation of a position as an “Assistant with a view to Partnership” within
an existing State-contracted practice; or
(3) Creation of a new position where the HSE has identified a gap in the
services available to public patients.
However, even where an existing contract-holder GP dies, retires or
resigns, the HSE may suppress the position and give the GP’s patient list to
other existing contract-holders. Moreover, the marking system for assessing
candidates explicitly favours giving patient lists to existing contract-holders.41
The HSE also has to give “due regard” to the “viability” of practices in the
area.42 This “viability” factor can often lead to a patient list being given to an
existing local practice instead of to a GP wishing to set up in competition with
the existing practice. Ensuring that the HSE system for making GP services
available to all public patients is viable is a valid objective but it is not 
the same as protecting the viability of particular practices. 
A key factor that is absent from the whole process is that the HSE does not
take into account the needs of private patients. The mandate given to the HSE
is to ensure that public patients have access to GP services and, where
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39 NCA (2010).
40 The percentage of GPs in private practice alone fell from 11 per cent in 1982 to just 4 per cent
in 2005, with most of the fall occurring in the period after 1992. There are no precise up-to-date
figures available on the number of private-only GP practices in Ireland. In 2008, three out of every
four GPs in Ireland held a GMS contract and thus one in four GPs do not hold a contract. Most of
the latter GPs are younger GPs who work as employees or locums in GP practices under State-
contracted GPs. Competition Authority (2010a, p. 24).
41 GPs with a GMS contract are awarded 20 points for each year working in general practice. Non-
GMS GPs with their own practices receive 15 points for every year in practice. GP assistants are
awarded 10 points per year. Competition Authority (2010a, p. 55).
42 Department of Health and Children, Circular on Entry to the GMS, Circular 3/96, 19 June
1996. 
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awarding State contracts in Ireland is often overlooked. It is generally
assumed that “the market” will take care of them. This ignores the fact that
the market for private patients is itself significantly affected by the
restrictions on State contracts. The rules governing access to State contracts
impact directly on the commercial behaviour of almost every GP practice in
the State – affecting decisions on where GPs locate, the number of GP
practices established, the nature of such practices and the profitability of
individual practices. This, in turn, affects the availability of services for
private patients and influences the prices GPs charge private patients. 
The Competition Authority found that, overall, the system protects
established GP practices from competition from new practices. As a result:
● Both public and private patients have fewer GP practices to choose from.
● There is less pressure on GP practices to compete on price for private
patients and to be innovative in the service they provide.
As the contracts are location-specific, the supply of GP services is slow to
respond to changing demographics (Layte et al., 2009, p. 61). Ironically, the
rationale generally given for restrictions on access to State contracts is that
the State wishes to ensure a geographic spread of services across the country
and to avoid “blackspot” areas that are without services. The concern is that
allowing GPs to choose their own location will lead to them all locating their
practices in popular residential areas. However, the restrictions on contracts
do not solve this problem. Ireland continues to have blackspot areas and 
the restrictions are creating further underserved areas (Layte et al., 2009, 
pp. 66-69). It also ignores the business need for GPs to locate where the
demand is and to avoid locating near to competitors, as well as exacerbating
the problem of GPs emigrating to the UK and hindering the HSE’s efforts to
attract Irish GPs working in the UK back to Ireland.
The Competition Authority recommended the opening up of State
contracts to all fully qualified GPs and the removal of the requirement on the
HSE to consider the viability of existing practices as well as the removal of the
location restriction on contracts. This is not as radical as it might sound as
there are a number of features of the market that continue to drive it in a
certain direction and make it unlikely that there will be a huge increase in the
number of new GP practices:
● To fully qualify as a GP takes 10 years and such GPs are scarce. 
● GPs are used to training and working in teams and increasingly prefer to
work in multi-partner practices (O’Dowd et al., 2006).
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et al., 2009, p. 61).
The implementation of these recommendations will lead to some increase
in the number of GP practices and also to GP services being more responsive
to changing demographics and consumer demands, and to more competition
between GP practices. Even the threat of the establishment of a competing GP
practice can help keep existing GP practices competitive – a threat that is
currently thwarted by the system for awarding State contracts.
In November 2010, the Irish Government agreed a Programme of
Financial Support with the EU/IMF and committed to … removing restric  tions
on GPs wishing to treat public patients by the end of Q3 of 2011.43
Implementing the Competition Authority’s recommendations would remove
the restrictions.
4.2.1.2 Pharmacy
Similar restrictions on State contracts for pharmacy services existed until
2002. Under the Health (Community Pharmacy Contractor Agreement)
Regulations 1996 (“the Regulations”), a new pharmacy could not obtain a
State contract if it was located within 250 meters of an existing pharmacy in
urban areas or within 5 kilometers in rural areas.44 In addition, the new
pharmacy could “not have an adverse impact on the viability of existing
community pharmacies in the area”.45 The Regulations created a clear barrier
to entry in that new pharmacies faced a cost not applied to existing
pharmacies. We thus had a situation where there were pharmacists willing to
supply services to consumers but were prevented from doing so. Before the
Regulations, from 1991 to 1996, the growth in contracted pharmacies was
greater than the growth in population. Between 1996 and 2001, the growth
rate in the number of contracted pharmacies dropped below that of the
population growth rate (Competition Authority, 2001b). 
In 2001, the Competition Authority recommended the removal of the
location restrictions within the Regulations. In 2002, following advice from the
Attorney General’s office during ongoing legal challenges to the Regulations,
they were revoked by the Minister for Health and pharmacy numbers began
to grow at a greater rate, to 1,300 pharmacies in Ireland in 2003 (Department
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43 EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for Ireland, revised May 2011, available from
www.finance.gov.ie
44 In 2001, only 22 of Ireland’s 1,200 pharmacies operated without a State contract. Competition
Authority (2001b).
45 Health (Community Pharmacy Contractor Agreement) Regulations, 1996, Section 2(1).
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can own pharmacies and where they can locate.
4.2.1.3  Dentistry
The Competition Authority recommended that once the independent oral
healthcare professions of “clinical dental technician” and “advanced dental
hygienist” were legally recognised by the Dental Council, they should be able
to be reimbursed under State schemes for providing their services. Thus State-
subsidised patients would also be able to avail of the option of going to see a
clinical dental technician or advanced dental hygienist directly. These
recommendations required that the Health Service Executive (“HSE”) and the
Department of Social Community and Family Affairs46 draw up State
contracts for these professions. Though Ireland now has registered clinical
dental technicians, Ireland’s changing economic fortunes has led to severe cut
backs in the State schemes and dentures are no longer subsidised for private
patients. Medical card holders can still avail of free dentures but the HSE has
not yet implemented this recommendation. (Advanced dental hygienists are
not yet legally recognised.)
4.2.2 Restrictions on Advertising
Excessive restrictions on truthful advertising and the supply of
information to patients, prevent consumers from shopping around and chill
price competition between healthcare providers. They also make it difficult for
new primary healthcare businesses to attract customers by informing them of
their existence, services and prices. The Competition Authority found
numerous excessive restrictions on advertising in the dental and GP
professions. In contrast, the Competition Authority found few unnecessary
restrictions on advertising of optometry services.47 Both the Medical Council
and Dental Council have since revised their advertising rules. The new rules
provide for much more freedom for GPs and dentists to advertise their
services, should they wish to do so.
Advertising restrictions on GPs have been withdrawn or relaxed for some
time in a number of countries. The British Medical Council, the Australian
Medical Association, the Canadian Medical Association and the German
Medical Association permit advertising by GPs. In 2003, the rules on
advertising for health services were liberalised in Denmark and this lead to
more price consciousness among consumers (OECD, 2004).
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Traditionally the healthcare professions, and their regulators, have been
wary of advertising. They were, justifiably, concerned that some suppliers
would make exaggerated or unscrupulous claims about their abilities and
encourage the over-consumption of medical treatment and medicines. Another
concern put forward was that advertising would simply lead to an increase in
costs and that the additional costs would ultimately be passed on to consumers
(OECD, 2004; Competition Authority, 2007, p. 61). Some of their reluctance
also came from a belief that advertising was purely a marketing ploy and that
it was just not “professional”. The Dental Council, for example, asserted that:
… [the] tradition in dentistry as in allied professions has been to avoid
advertising and to rely on word of mouth and quality of service to build a
practice … (Competition Authority, 2007, p. 61).
Unfortunately in the case of dentists and GPs, the combination of these
legitimate concerns and outdated views had resulted in an outright ban on
almost all forms of advertising. For example:
● The only sign dentists and GPs were allowed to use to attract attention to
their premises was the traditional brass plate, of specified dimensions. 
● A new dental practice was only allowed to advertise its existence by
placing a notice in the press six times in its first year of operation and
these notices could not exceed a 5 centimeter single column. Flyers,
leaflets, posters, etc. were all forbidden. Similar restrictions applied to
GPs.
● Advertising of prices was expressly forbidden by the Dental Council. The
Medical Council also discouraged it. In addition, dentists were not allowed
to advertise discounts.
● In general, GPs and dentists were encouraged to provide information to
customers and potential customers within the walls of their practice. This
is really information provision, not advertising, as it does not attract
custom.
The restrictions were very harmful to competition. 
● First, they severely constrained the ability of new practices to publicise
their existence and, therefore, reduced the likelihood that consumers
would be aware of a new dentist or GP in their area. This simply protected
the position of dentists and GPs already established in the locality. 
● Second, they limited price competition for private patients. It is extremely
difficult for consumers to make price comparisons and shop around for the
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charge more than they would in a more transparent, competitive
environment. 
● Third, they reduced the incentives for GP and dental practices to offer new
or innovative ways of delivering their services. Dentists and GPs who
wished to differentiate themselves by making such investments were
unable to use advertising to effectively promote their new services and
facilities in an effort to attract new patients and recoup their investment.
The analysis of the Competition Authority pointed out that there are
different types of advertising and that while some are harmful to consumers,
others are actually beneficial. Truthful, informative advertising – for example,
a new GP practice distributing a flyer in the local area to raise awareness of
their existence, location, standard consultation fee and opening hours – can
help consumers to choose the best practitioner for them. It can also stimulate
price competition between practices. 
International experience has shown that truthful advertising of profes  -
sional healthcare services does not have a negative impact on the quality of
care provided. Far from increasing prices to consumers, informative
advertising of the services provided by healthcare professionals has been
found to lower prices. Evidence in support of the pro-competitive effects of
advertising in markets for professional healthcare services dates back to
studies in the 1970s.49 On the other hand, misleading advertising – for
example, claiming specialist expertise that you do not actually have –
frustrates the competitive process and is harmful to consumers. 
The Authority also showed how it is possible for the regulatory rules to
distinguish between these different types of advertising and thus to relax the
regulatory rules on advertising in a way which would improve the delivery of
primary healthcare. The Competition Authority was able to point to the
experience of the Opticians Board, who imposed relatively few restrictions on
advertising by opticians.50 Opticians have been working in normal-looking
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48 A survey carried out by Indecon International Economic Consultants in 2002 revealed that the
majority of consumers considered that there was virtually no, or very little, price competition
among dentists in Ireland, and the public felt that they did not have access to adequate
information on the fees charged by dentists. Indecon (2003b, Section 10).
49 Benham (1972), and Benham et al. (1975) both examined optometry which was at the time one
of the few professions in the USA with significant State to State variation in permissible
advertising. Using data from a national survey of consumers it was found that advertising
resulted in significantly lower prices. Other studies of the time reported similar findings and more
recent studies have confirmed them. See also Bond et al. (1980) and Love et al. (1996).
50 The Competition Authority identified two restrictions on advertising by optometrists, and these
were removed by the Opticians Board and the Association of Optometrists in March 2010.
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relatively freely in Ireland for many years now, without any harm to patients’
health. 
Following the Competition Authority’s analysis of the Dental and Medical
Council’s rules on advertising, the rules have been substantially revised and
no longer impose such severe restrictions.51 The Medical Council’s new
guidelines explicitly recognise the positive role advertising can play in the
delivery of healthcare services:
The provision of information about the availability of medical services through
the media, internet or other means is generally in the public interest provided
that the information is factually accurate, evidence-based and not misleading.
(Medical Council, 2009, p. 49)
The relaxation of the rules on advertising has not led to an avalanche of
advertising by GPs and dentists. It will take time for awareness of the new
rules to develop and the culture of the professions to change. Where we are
starting to see advertising is precisely where you would expect to see it – new
GP practices advertising locally through leaflets and flyers. Over time, basic
advertising should become the norm and consumers will be better informed
and better able to seek out value for money.
In May 2010, the National Consumer Agency (“NCA”) conducted a survey
of the extent to which GPs and dentists display a schedule of their charges
inside their practice. The survey found that only 32 per cent of dentists and 50
per cent of doctors surveyed displayed a schedule of fees on their premises
(NCA, 2010). In June 2011, the Dental Council brought in a new Code of
Practice requiring all practising dentists in Ireland to display a price list for
routine dental procedures (NCA, 2011). Transparency in the fees charged by
dentists and GPs to their existing customers is an important consumer
protection that complements advertising to facilitate competition. For
example, a flyer from a new dental practice outlining its fees is of less use to
a potential customer if they do not know the fee schedule of their existing
dentist. The NCA hopes that a similar agreement will be reached on price
display by GPs shortly.
4.3 Price-setting
EU and Irish competition law protects consumers, businesses, and the
State from collective action designed to force them to pay higher prices than
they would otherwise have to. In the GPs report, the Competition Authority
334 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
51 Dental Council (2008) and Medical Council (2009).
04 Boate PP Paper_ESRI Vol 42-1  16/09/2011  10:00  Page 334identified a problem in the State contract between the Health Service
Executive (“HSE”) and GPs which could get in the way of this important
protection. 
4.3.1  General Practitioners
The contract between GPs and the HSE provides that any changes in the
fees paid to GPs under the contract require the agreement of the Irish Medical
Organisation (the “IMO”), the main representative body for doctors in Ireland.
This gives an extraordinary level of power to the IMO, akin to a veto on
change. Collective negotiations by GPs on fees, for example through the IMO,
are prohibited by Irish and European competition law.52 This means that GPs,
who are businesses and not employees of the State, cannot collectively decide
through the IMO what price to charge the State and collectively refuse to
accept any less. GPs with State contracts do not enjoy the protections of
employment law, such as the right to strike, but they are also free to charge
private patients whatever they think the market will bear. Competition law
protects the State from paying excess prices for GP services purchased by the
HSE.
Thus the Competition Authority recommended that payments to GPs by
the State should be decided, not on the basis of agreement with the IMO, but
unilaterally by the Minister for Health and Children. Of course the Minister
can consult the IMO, and individual GPs, on their views, but the IMO cannot
force the Minister to accept a particular price. The Competition Authority
pointed to a recent judgment of the Irish High Court which set out an
approved approach to fee-setting (“the Hickey approach”) that does not conflict
with competition law.53 A judgement in the European Court of Justice has
similarly provided legal clarity regarding another mechanism for fee-setting
that does not conflict with EU competition law.54 The Minister for Health has
already implemented the Authority’s recommendation, though not by
changing the contract. Under the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public
Interest Act 2009 (the “FEMPI Act”), the Minister has unilaterally cut the
payments made to GPs under State schemes, twice.
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52 The Competition Authority stated that it was of the view, on the basis of legal advice, that GPs
contracted to provide services to public patients under the terms of their contract with the HSE
are “undertakings” for the purposes of the Competition Act 2002 and thus fall within the remit of
the Act. Competition Authority (2010a, p. 62).
53 Hickey and others v HSE [2007], judgement of 11 September 2008. 
54 Case C – 35/99 Arduino [2002] ECR I – 1529, [2002] 4 CMLR 866.
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However, in the 2010 “Croke Park Agreement”, the then Government
committed to discussions with the IMO about granting them an exemption
from competition law when engaged in collective negotiations with the State
(Department of Finance, 2010, p. 8).55 This would be a complete reversal of the
Competition Authority’s recommendation. More importantly, it would give the
IMO the legal authority to block the implementation of any Government policy
seeking to change the way primary care is funded. Pharmacists, dentists and
others are lining up behind the IMO and seeking a similar exemption from
competition law.56
The harm that would be caused by such an exemption is evident from the
disruption to pharmacy services in August 2009, when the Minister for Health
and Children moved to reduce the mark-up paid to retail pharmacies by the
State under the Drugs Payment Scheme from 50 per cent to 20 per cent under
the FEMPI Act. A third of pharmacies closed their doors in protest and the
Health Service Executive had to set up emergency pharmacies across the
country to ensure patients had access to medicines. Under competition law,
the pharmacies could not collectively agree on what mark-up they would
accept from the State, nor could they collectively agree to withdraw their
services. If the pharmacies had an exemption from competition law, they
would have been legally entitled to freely agree among themselves to
collectively boycott the State’s drugs schemes to try to force the Minister not
to lower the mark-up to 20 per cent. Collective action by pharmacies would
have removed the risk for each individual pharmacy of losing valuable
customers to those pharmacies that did not boycott the scheme. After eleven
days, the pharmacies climbed down and the new arrangements went through,
creating estimated savings of €133 million each year on medicines for the
State (Department of Health, 2009).
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55 This commitment was a restatement of a previous commitment to pursue amendments to
section 4 of the Competition Act 2002 … to enable the representative body for GPs, the Irish
Medical Organisation, to represent its members in negotiations with the HSE and the Department
of Health and Children in respect of services provided to the public health service in a manner
consistent with the public interest, Department of Health (2008).
56 IPU (2010): “Rory O’Donnell, Donegal Pharmacist and newly elected IPU Vice-President put
forward the motion: ‘That this AGM calls on both the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Innovation and the Minister for Health and Children to ensure that any exemption that may be
granted in the new Competition Act to the Irish Medical Organisation should also apply to all
representative bodies for healthcare professionals’.” Also, “Service cuts by stealth”, Irish Medical
News, 24 May 2010, page 13: … the [Irish Dental] Association met Health Minister Mary Harney
… [and] offered to engage in intensive negotiations over three months, to allow for the necessary
amendments to competition law.
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Pharmaceutical Union or the Irish Dental Association) an exemption from
competition law when engaged in collective negotiations with the State would
be akin to giving them a blank cheque. They would be legally entitled to use
anti-competitive means, such as a collective boycott, when engaging with the
State on fees for the treatment of medical card holders, the administration of
flu vaccines, etc. It is also unnecessary. Competition law creates no barrier to
the State setting the prices and fees it is willing or able to pay primary
healthcare providers, nor to the IMO being consulted on its views on fees and
indeed all other aspects of the contract. Also, in addition to the court-approved
approaches mentioned earlier, the Competition Authority has published
guidance on some models that enable the healthcare providers themselves to
engage with the State on the matter of fees while maintaining compliance
with competition law (Competition Authority, 2009). 
All parties agree that a new GP contract is needed. Competition law does
not prevent the Department of Health and the HSE from discussing all the
relevant issues with the IMO or any other group of GPs. In May 2011, the new
Irish Government agreed a new revised Programme of Financial Support with
the EU/IMF and committed that … no … exemptions to the competition law
framework will be granted unless they are entirely consistent with the goals of
the EU/IMF supported programme and the needs of the economy.57 The new
Government has not yet indicated whether it plans to exempt the IMO or any
other group from competition law.
V  WHO REGULATES THE PROFESSIONS?
The Dental Council is almost entirely composed of members of the dental
profession or those involved in the education of dentists; two of the 19
members are appointed to represent consumer interests. The Opticians Board
has a similar membership structure with no consumer representative. Before
the enactment of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 and the Pharmacy Act
2007, the Medical Council and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland were
similarly structured.
The Competition Authority took the view that it was not … necessary,
proportionate or transparent58 for a regulator to be run mainly by the
profession being regulated and thus these regulatory structures were
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available from www.finance.gov.ie
58 See, for example, Competition Authority (2007, p. 69).
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pointed out that other professions and other countries were moving to
structures that favoured a broader range of interests. Indeed, the Health and
Social Care Professionals Act 2005 favoured a majority of non-members of the
profession. The Competition Authority was concerned that, in the case where
the vast majority of the members of the regulator come from the core
profession being regulated, this can raise conflicts of interests regarding the
regulation of the profession in the interests of consumers and furthering the
interests of the profession. The Competition Authority recommended that the
composition of the regulators be amended to reflect a larger number of
interests, none of whom should be in a majority. For example, the Dental
Council should have dental hygienists, clinical dental technicians, and experts
in regulation and consumer protection in its membership, and not a voting
majority of dentists.
The composition of regulators in the medical and pharmacy professions
has been rebalanced following the Competition Authority’s recommendations.
For example, the Medical Council is now composed of 25 members with equal
voting rights: at least nine of whom … are not, and never have been, a medical
practitioner …; ten are required to be medical practitioners; and the
remaining six may or may not be medical practitioners but at least four of
them could be expected not to be as they are nominated by An Bord Altranais,
the Health and Social Care Professions Council and the Health Service
Executive.60 The Fitness to Practice Committee, which inquires into
complaints from the public about doctors, must have a majority of persons who
are not medical practitioners.61 The Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland is
similarly balanced and, furthermore, must refer drafts of its code of conduct to
the Competition Authority for its opinion as to … whether any provision of the
draft code would, if given effect, be likely to result in competition being
prevented, restricted or distorted.62  The Opticians Board and the Dental
Council require similar reform.63
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59 Department of The Taoiseach (2004).
60 Section 17 of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007. An Bord Altranais regulates nurses and the
Health and Social Care Professions Council regulates 13 healthcare professions, including:
psychologists, physiotherapists and chiropodists.
61 Section 20(10) of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007.
62 Section 12 of the Pharmacy Act 2007.
63 The Government has indicated that the Opticians Board will be brought under the Health and
Social Care Professions Council, which should give effect to this recommendation. Dáil Éireann
Debate Vol. 731 No. 1, 3 May 2011.
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Several over-arching conclusions can be drawn from this body of work by
the Competition Authority. First and foremost, understanding how primary
healthcare businesses compete – and recognising that they do compete – has
an important role in understanding how to improve the delivery of healthcare
services in Ireland. If we do not understand competition, well-intentioned
regulations and policies are less likely to be effective and can even be harmful.
In particular, the interaction between public regulations and contracts and
private behaviour by businesses, and the resulting impact on private patients,
needs to be fully appreciated. 
Second, competition policy is entirely compatible with healthcare policy.
The above examples show how allowing more competition in some areas –
such as allowing competing professions and truthful advertising – can actually
improve healthcare delivery and reduce Ireland’s healthcare expenditure.64
Third, regular reviews of regulatory and administrative systems in
healthcare are vital to ensuring they are appropriate to the task at hand. This
is particularly important in the area of related professions. As education and
qualifications change, regulatory and administrative systems need to adapt,
otherwise they risk excluding qualified professionals from offering their
services in Ireland and reducing the availability of services. The Dental and
Medical Councils’ decisions to allow dentists and GPs much more freedom to
advertise shows how regulators also need to be in touch with the research on
best practice in regulation.
Fourth, the regulation of healthcare professions should not be handed over
to the profession itself. Traditionally, the councils and boards in charge of the
rules for each profession were comprised wholly or in the majority of people
from the profession. A more balanced membership and variety of voices is
required. 
Fifth, there is room for the State and consumers to get better value for
money in primary healthcare. Value for money for consumers and the State in
primary healthcare is assured where (a) there is the widest possible pool of
qualified professionals available, and (b) the State has the protection of
competition law in setting the prices it is willing and able to pay primary
healthcare providers. 
Recent policy changes – to rebalance the membership of regulators away
from a majority of the profession itself; to recognise new para-professions; to
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preventing any advertising; to allow pharmacies to locate where they wish;
and to unilaterally decide on the fees payable under State contracts – have all
contributed to making primary care services, and the regulations governing
them, more flexible and responsive to the needs of the general public and the
exchequer. Increased recognition of qualified professions (in dental and
optometry services) and the opening up of State contracts to all eligible
suppliers (in GP and dental services) would further build on this and provide
the potential for a greater supply of services and competition to existing
primary care businesses. These changes, together with greater price
transparency through price display, all encourage a change in the culture of
the healthcare professions towards one where it is no longer considered
“unprofessional” to provide a competitive service. 
Appropriately designed regulation and systems for State funding of
primary healthcare can ensure that competition works well for consumers and
contributes to the better availability and quality of primary healthcare
services at the lowest possible cost. This in turn helps curb Ireland’s overall
health expenditure and improve our competitiveness.
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